Cowboys and Indians

[RAENORTH]

With due respect to Lt-Col Gus Fair DSO, the CO of the Light Dragoons battle group, this officer has lost the plot. That is one of the comments to his piece in The Daily Telegraph, where the Lt-Col tells us that our soldiers' sacrifice in Afghanistan "will be worth it". The progress he has seen "proves that we can win the war and help create a better society." And the commentator is not wrong.

View full article here

[therewaslight]

Brilliant phrase to use. Apt, insightful, and best of all, funny. It also helps bring understanding of this complex issue to a wider audience. Must use again.

[stevemacmanaman]

Can you confirm your source for the tribal make up of the population of Garmsir and surrounding locales, please. I have reason to doubt the veracity of your claims and would strongly contend that some of those tribes you have listed are not represented by a single person in the population of Darvishan or any of the area surrounding the canal system to the south. Thanks.

[therewaslight]

Don't know what Richard's source was, maybe multiple, but I've posted this map a few times.

Colours represent ethnic majorities. Garmsir is just below the light blue which represents the Tajiks. This and other tribal maps can be found at the The Program for Culture & Conflict Studies here.

[RAENORTH]

Can you confirm your source for the tribal make up of the population of Garmsir and surrounding locales, please. I have reason to doubt the veracity of your claims and would strongly contend that some of those tribes you have listed are not represented by a single person in the population of Darvishan or any of the area surrounding the canal system to the south. Thanks.

Therewaslight has it one ... there was no one source - otherwise I would have linked to it. For some time, I've been building files of tribal/ethnic mixes in different provinces, and I collected together multiple sources, and pulled data from them to make that list. Some of the sources are a bit dated ... others are very recent, although some of the information may be older. What came across though from multiple authors - and my own searches - was the difficulty in determining the precise composition of population sub-groups in the region. I am thus always open to correction ... that is a given on this blog/forum but, as far as I am aware, there has been no comprehensive, recent survey of the population structure, the results of which are available in the public domain.

The maps themselves are only approximations ... and different maps show different compostions, which adds to the confusion.

As a point of reference, though, Lt-Col Fair was referring to the Babaji area - northeast of Lashkar Gah, and it was to that area to which my list applied. Your reference is to Darvishan - presumably Kuchnay Darvishan - which is well south of Garmsir. We seem to be talking about completely different areas and, as you know, tribal/ethnic mix varies considerably over even relatively short distances. The area to which you refer is primarily Durrani, interestingly with a group of Popalzai, the tribe from which Karzai originates. US sources also refer to Barakzai in the area ... which they spell "Barackside", the photo coming from a US source, the caption of which has a US officer speaking to a "Barackside" elder. And in these and other areas, no account is taken of migratory nomads, who may well be either Balochi or Ghilzai.

[RAENORTH]

NB: "The district is one of the most culturally diverse in Helmand and is composed of 13 different tribal groups." ... and some!

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstop ... lmand.html

[stevemacmanaman]

Thanks for replying, I didn't mean to be negative or cast doubt on your report, I am just very interested on what official stats say about these areas (and where these stats are). I'll just let you know a little of my background and that I'm interested because I've spent 2 months in a Patrol Base in Garmsir shortly after the USMC had handed over to ANA. Thats just so we all know where each of us are coming at this from.

When referring to Darvishan I'm using the name for Garmsir District Centre. Its shown on Google Maps as Qurya and Garmsir, but they are not accurate. When in the area Garmsir means the whole district, which as you can see from the map above is huge and includes a lot of completely uninhabited ground. The locals use the term Darvishan, which is also reflected on the 1:50000 maps we use. Kuchnay Darvishan is a different town at the base of the "Snakeshead" as the Americams term it (the area of extended arable land, serviced by a canal system, that bulges out below Darvishan and then constricts again around Kucnay Darvishan), which is the next area south of Darvishan that has a substantial concentration of shops. I spent my time in an area on the eastern side of the Snakes head patrolling on foot into the small villages that farm the arable area.

The reason I'm interested in the official stats and demographics is that they are not accurate in the slightest. The map shown shows Tajiks being the dominant tribal group from the south of Lashkar Gar all the way down through Nawa, past Garmsir and half way down from Garmsir to the bend in the River Helmand (known as the "Fishhook" by ISAF). Having patrolled the extent of that area I can say that we did not see a single Tajik south of the Bost Arifield (the southern limit of Lashkar Gar city). The ANA Company we worked with were mostly from Badakeshan in NE Afghanistan and a number of commanders couldn't speak Pashto and almost none could speak Pakhto as we got further south. If the majority in this area were Tajiks this wouldn't have been a problem at all as they speak Dari as well, but there were no Tajiks in this area to be found.

This is no criticism of yourselves or this blog, because you have to use the information available to you, it is a criticism of the organisations that should find this information out to inform our actions (DIS, PJHQ, FCO, DFiD, UNHCR), as how can we take bias and preference out of our actions on a tactical level if these details are not understood at a strategic level. I believe much in the same vein as the message of your blog.

I agree with your assertion in the blog that we do (naturally one might argue) prefer to work with those that are accessible to us (whether geographically or more often in their mentality, willingness to perform actions that make us believe they are coming round to our way of thinking or even just which leaders of different groups is more personable) and I don't believe that thought is going into not tripping ourselves up in the long term for the sake of short term achievements; If only 1 of 3 tribal leaders is willing to let ISAF troops into his village, then it is clear which one is going to receive the first bit of reconstruction and development (R&D). But what about the second bit of R&D? The commander will probably understand that it will be a bad idea to just give it straight away to the previous recipient, but two things could cloud his judgment: 1. If he is nearing the end of his tour and understands that another completed project will reflect very favourably on himself and his unit, or 2. If he has just been replaced, the new commander might not understand the importance of not showing favouritism as he doesn't understand the delicate local tribal dynamics. ( I have heard villages who do not want to receive aid for fear of retribution dismissed as Taliban, rather than locals in the very real fear of Taliban influence because we have not given a suitable security infrastructure before attempting R&D).

These problems around the starts and ends of tours obviously put our length of tour in a different light when it is considered that in a 12 month period a quarter of that time is spent with a Bde either being in its last or first month in theatre. But what would solve these problems in one fell swoop and put a subject matter expert on political interactions of different tribal groups, Afghan Government departments, ISAF, reconcilable insurgents and hard line insurgents (essentially all the players on the stage)? Proper deployment and use of a political officer as you described in your earlier blog referring to Adam Holloway MPs CPS pamphlet. I took great cheer at the time from the announcement that a 2 star equivalent member of the FCO was being posted to Lashkar Gar to head up the British efforts in Helmand, obviously in outranking the Bde Comd of TFH on paper (command relationships did not put him in command of him, but this was still a step forward). But after months of waiting to see a single member of the FCO or DFiD in areas that so desperately needed them to head up R&D and political engagement and were benign enough to have ANA vehicles moving in single vehicle moves with very little force protection, and British vehicles moving in 2 vehicle moves only really in case of breakdown(!), my enthusiasm waned and nothing since has proven to me that I should be confident of that enthusiasm returning while that organisation has the ethos that it does.

Even if we did understand the subtle differences, we don't have the people in the jobs who are willing to do anything about it. And so you end up leaning even more on the Armed Forces to undertake activities more suited to the very people we are paying to sit in the PRT in Lashkar Gar. And then we complain when the Army are not excellent at the FCOs job and rely on kinetic effects and defeating the enemy rather than winning the local population too much.

"If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem in front of you becomes a nail"


Yours is a great blog and really helps analysis of current issues from the angle that our insipid and agenda driven media does not shed light on. Thank you.

[RAENORTH]

Thanks ... really appreciated. The issues you raise are very much germane to the whole problem. We have endless reports from theatre, the veracity and accuracy of which is unknown, from which it is virtually impossible to draw a coherent picture. I'm going to think about what you have written, and build it into my posts, rather than respond directly. What is interesting about this area, however, is that in the 50s and 60s, there was a deliberate attempt at social engineering, which accounts for the tribal and ethnic diversity. If you are not already aware of this, this paper gives a fascinating insight.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/icas/Cullather.pdf

On a human note, although I have not been there, you don't have to know the area to make certain suppositions as to the behaviour of people. I suspect Tajiks in this area would be about as popular as a Catholics on the Crumlin Road. That your ANA were from Badakhshan is really interesting. We have great difficulty in getting data on the ethnic mix of ANA forces ... ISAF/HMG are very coy on this.

Badakhshan is a fascinating area, with a mixed population, ethnic Pashmirs Tajiks and Pashtuns (Kuchi) It was one of the areas where Pashtun nomads were forcibly resettled under the Abdur Rahman regime. Detailed report here:

http://www.cpau.org.af/Research/Docs_ou ... b%2009.pdf

One wonders precisely what the ethnic mix of the ANA troops actually was!

[therewaslight]

Thanks for that too... since the media on the ground in Afghanistan don't ask the right questions and report the important facts our only sources are those available online. The above map of Helmand province is likely out of date in at least its representation of Tajik numbers. One suspects the population shifts quite a lot.

[cause4concern]

Well, according to some sources the coalition are arming the Balochi separatists, and with the surge coming, I would expect some changes coming soon; assuming of course Obama signs on the dotted line... Pakistan may be no more.

[RAENORTH]

Well, according to some sources the coalition are arming the Balochi separatists ...

Quite handy that, if the Balochis have joined up with the Taliban. With the Indians also funding them, they should be quite formidable.

[cause4concern]

Indeed. So who is it, I wonder, that we are aiming our 'anti-militant' operations in Baluchistan....? The southern Pashtuns are on side, we're arming the BLA... theres no Al'quaeda down there as far as I am aware...

[Tom Mix]

Cowboys won.

[RAENORTH]

This sheds some interesting light on the issue ...

http://www.scottshelmandvalleyarchives. ... -71-01.pdf

The Tajiks reported in the area were all Pashto speakers, and indistinguishable from the other ethnic groups, working on plots alongside Pashtuns.

See also this: dated, but a good baseline.

http://easterncampaign.files.wordpress. ... tt1980.pdf

[stevemacmanaman]

Thanks for the follow on links, very informative and enlightening. I didn't realise that ISAF are cagey about the demographics of the ANA, but I believe they aim to reflect the exact make up of the population of Afghanistan by percentage in each Battalion and as a whole I think they do. On reflection, I was misleading in my earlier statement about Badakshan. The majority of the Chain of Command of the Company I mentored was from Badakshan (OC, 2IC, 1 x Pl Comd, CSM and around 3 or 4 SNCOs) which makes you feel like they are mostly from there but on thinking about it an awful lot of the ORs were from different provinces like Kandahar, Lagman, Paktia, Kabul etc.

To be honest with you I'm not the best placed person to get into intellectual debate about this for the same reasons many serving personnel are not. Our advantages can also be our disadvantages: Whilst many of us believe that our intimate knowledge and experience of the situation qualifies us more than others to talk about it, but it just that point that will disqualify us from being able to emotionally detach ourselves, appreciate the bigger picture and listen to others opinions. I experienced this in myself immediately after returning, but only noticed it recently as a bit of time let me create a bit of breathing space to understand. Some Staff Officers will argue that there position slightly elevated to allow greater situational awareness qualifies them to speak on these matters but it doesn't. I saw when you quoted the USAF stats for air delivered ordnance dropped around Lashkar Gar earlier this year and a person saying they were an ops offr in 3 Cdo Bde got very shirty with you that we just can't detach enough when it is talking about something we were intimately involved in that involved in the death of others. You can also see that in the pulp fiction that is being produced from theatre now (all these where people are amusingly cack handed about reworking the truth to something more in keeping with the message that is going to sell more books, as you also blogged on earlier this year)

For that reason I'm going to slope back to being an interested reader again and not a participant. Thanks.