Insufficient leadership

[RAENORTH]

Predictably, the media are giving heavy coverage to the "Nimrod Review" into the wider issues surrounding the loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006, commissioned by former defence secretary Des Browne on 13 December 2007, and delivered yesterday by Charles Haddon-Cave QC. The piece by Michael Evans, in The Times is, for instance, headed: "Nimrod report is most devastating in living memory". It reports that the accident occurred because of years of complacency, safety reviews that were riddled with errors and a general lack of care towards the personnel who had to fly the aircraft in a dangerous environment.

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[James Bull]

Well said.

Air Commodore George Baber, the Nimrod IPT Leader criticised in the report, has moved up to a more senior role of Head of Air Systems
(LinkedIn profile below).

2006 — Present (3 years)

Provided governance framework of Policy, Rules and Standards to assure the airworthiness of aircraft and helicopters acquired or in use by the Armed Forces, and the quality of products and services procured by the Ministry of Defence. Leadership of a 350-strong organisation (predominantly civilian), dispersed geographically throughout the UK.

It seems that the systemic failure is in danger of being perpetuated.

[John Coles]

Yes, agreed.
I felt much the same about the shameful HMS Cornwall shambles in the Gulf and suggested that the Second Sea Lord had a lot to answer for.
Senior levels of the Services can become as much infected by the attitudes of our "leading politicians" as, say, the NHS or Local Government.
It takes strength of character to resist the idiocies of a decadent political class. Uniquely, Service heads COULD do so. But, hey, what about the pension? Don't want to risk that, do we?

[Derek W Buxton]

Not particularly surprising, there is an attitude of making sure your back is covered in case something goes belly up. Don't do the job properly, just make sure you are covered! Sounds just like BSS 5940, became ISO10000. I think they were the numbers but it is a long time ago. Many "consultants" were spawned by that lousy piece of work which said "keep the paperwork straight and it doen't matter about the product". You could make a crap product but as long as you wrote a specification for it , it was ok.

Derek

[brian williams]

I read a book recently called "lions, donkeys and dinosors" it quoted a senior RAF officer from the JHC stating "we are not a taxi service for the army" and further detailed the RAFs resistance to anything other than sub Cold War/Battle of Britain air combat. It has neglected ground attack and transport roles in favour of a "Top Gun" focus. It seems to undermined the Army Air Corps and Fleet Air Arm for no other reason then service rivally. The decision to scrap the carrier fleet in the 60's and 70's seems heavily influenced by RAF lobbying. The RAF performance in Iraq and Afghanistan seems lamentable in terms of providing tactical air support to the army. The impression I get is a huge non flying admin structure attached to a puny number of actual combat squadrons with a large surplus of Group Captains, Wing Commanders and Marshall each thinking they are Bomber Harris/ Leigh Mallory.

[oldrightie]

"We do ourselves no favours if we buy into the media myth, and ignore that which is now becoming all too evident, that the military shares some of the dysfunctional elements which are all too prevalent in the whole of our society."

A superb statement. How on earth did it come to this? One argument is the dumbing down of education. Bliar once said, (the only bit of sense he ever did)
"Comprehensive education is a thirty year failed experiment." In this I see the fundemental breakdown in lack of respect for elders and teachers, a casual dismissiveness of wise old heads, history and social responsibility. We have a nuclear deterrent but no such deterrent for failure discipline within our own lives and our nation as a whole.
The final beacon of hope is our armed forces but even here the quality and calibre of our service people is showing a deterioration. The dreadful Puma accident for one, the Nimrod another. My last, some 15 years back now, flight into an RAF base on an air ambulance trip, I was appalled at the scruffy and dirty appearance of the personnel, the base and the whole lazy, undisciplined atmosphere. That was a long time back.

[GallimaufryandChips]

Colonel John Boyd, USAF said that one could either be someone or do something.

[therewaslight]

Off topic but I thought it might interest someone - another variable

Tony Perry LA Times

As Marines train to deploy to war zones, there is daily discussion about how to detect and disarm the buried roadside bombs that are the No. 1 killer of Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Military researchers have found that two groups of personnel are particularly good at spotting anomalies: those with hunting backgrounds, who traipsed through the woods as youths looking to bag a deer or turkey; and those who grew up in tough urban neighborhoods, where it is often important to know what gang controls which block.

Personnel who fit neither category, often young men who grew up in the suburbs and developed a liking for video games, do not seem to have the depth perception and peripheral vision of the others, even if their eyesight is 20/20.

The findings do not surprise Army Sgt. Maj. Todd Burnett, the top enlisted man with the Pentagon-based Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, which conducted the study. He's made multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and ridden in more than 1,000 convoys and, on 19 occasions, been in a vehicle hit by a roadside bomb.

The best troops he's ever seen when it comes to spotting bombs were soldiers from the South Carolina National Guard, nearly all with rural backgrounds that included hunting.

"They just seemed to pick up things much better," Burnett said. "They know how to look at the entire environment."

Troops from urban backgrounds also seemed to have developed an innate "threat-assessment" ability. Both groups, said Army research psychologist Steve Burnett, "seem very adaptable to the kinds of environments" seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Video game enthusiasts are narrower in their focus, as if the windshield of their Humvee is a computer screen. "The gamers are very focused on the screen rather than the whole surrounding," said Sgt. Maj. Burnett (no relation to the research psychologist).

About 800 military personnel at Twentynine Palms and several other bases took part in a complex set of vision and perception tests, follow-up interviews and personality tests. Test subjects were asked to find hidden bombs in pictures, videos, virtual reality exercises and open-air obstacle courses, including on pitch-dark nights.

Although many of the findings remain classified -- lest the enemy discover what the U.S. has learned about its methods of burying and detonating the devices -- military officials agreed to discuss the eyesight portion of the study.

The study was completed in June, and its results are being circulated for peer review to researchers with security clearances. It took 18 months to carry out and cost $5.4 million.

After eight years of war and billions of dollars spent on electronic detection, the best technology for spotting improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, remains the sharp-eyed Marine, soldier or sailor.

[Guest]

As someone working in defence procurement I can testify to the way that the MOD structure is designed to protect the backs and reputations of senior staff, both uniformed and civilian, from any criticism on high that might arise from failure. Failure generally means project delays or not remaining within budget. What has happened over the last decade is a complex process, but essentially is this:

The 1990s saw the departure of many skilled and experienced MOD staff, Service and civilian. Constant defence cuts and the feeling that there were better career prospects outside led to a steady exodus. One result was that a good many high quality senior officers left prematurely and were replaced by the Second XI. From 1997 the imposition of a target driven culture by New Labour (or more specifically by Gordon Brown's Treasury) meant that the fitness of procurement team leaders was measured numerically - usually in terms of financial and time targets. Promotion and career progression depended very largely on achieving those targets or at least giving the impression that the targets were being met (compare the situation with the Soviet 5 Year Plans). Intangibles or less easily measured factors such as safety, quality of service, or changed user needs were either ignored or covered up. Telling the truth or pointing out inconvenient facts in meetings made you unpopular with team leaders. The watchword was 'bring me solutions, not problems'. The trouble was that sometimes there were no solutions other than extra time, money or specialised expert staff, but this was an unacceptable demand.

Senior staff in the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and Defence Logistic Organisation (DLO) were under constant pressure to make cuts while the country was attempting to fight a series of expensive wars and of course they simply lent on the middle and junior managers below them to achieve this. The Nimrod report describes the approach used by General Cowan to hit financial targets as being 'Stalinist', although Stalin would probably have cared a lot more about the Red Army. Those staff who failed to achieve the financial reductions would have their careers blighted. Is it therefore so surprising that the Nimrod safety case was glossed over and sub-contracted to outside companies? The problems have not been solved, with the successor organisation (Defence Equipment & Support) apparently facing a 25-30% reduction in the staff salary bill. Before readers cheer, you can guarantee that these cuts will fall very largely on junior (and very expert) staff who actually do the coal face work, not the excessive layers of administrators and senior managers. We will simply end up with an even more disproportionate number of chiefs and fewer indians and there will be even less understanding of the basic issues.

The whole underlying culture is wrong, but it is a direct result of the continuing imbalance between the number of grandiose projects being pursued, the wars being fought, the political demands of British industry for new contracts, the touching MOD belief that working 'more efficiently using IT' will do the trick, and constant Treasury demands for constant reductions.

What is needed is some fundamental strategic thinking. Both major political parties are committed to continuing the expeditionary strategy (i.e. poking your nose into other countries' internal affairs) that demands such expensive projects as FRES, the CVF carriers and A400M transports. This is justified because despite being effectively bankrupt we still like to think we are a major power 'punching above our weight'. It also helps justify the permanent UN Security Council seat. It is funny how countries richer than us (Germany, Japan, even Italy) do not feel the urge to do the same thing and can therefore concentrate their defence resources on a more limited and affordable set of missions. If the UK wants to be a big player it will have to spend much more on defence procurement. Of course the procurement process can always be made more efficient and there is no doubt that DE&S needs some root and branch reform, but that is not enough. As it stands we are in the impossible position of trying to be a global power on a regional budget and skimping on procurement is one of the ways in which we try to kid ourselves and others that we are a big player. What is needed is a fundamental reassessment of our role in the world.

Unfortunately I suspect the forthcoming 2010 defence review will simply try to modify existing policy and paper over the cracks. There is too much political prestige at stake to admit the truth.

[Subrosa]

I have to agree with Guest at 10.52pm. As I said in my post staff left the service because of problems. Richard, I know you've criticised me for not reading the report and posting, but much of my post's content was given first hand to me by a trustworthy source.

I thought it was important to my readership to name the people named in the report and that was the reason for the post. After all, I don't live a million miles away from the base concerned.

If there are inaccuracies in my post then please point them out, but don't accuse me of just copy typing the Times article because I did not do that in this case. I can be guilty on other occasions I admit.

Anyway, thank you for taking the trouble to read the whole thing. I too heard it's a hard read so I don't think I'll bother.

[RAENORTH]

As someone working in defence procurement I can testify to the way that the MOD structure is designed to protect the backs and reputations of senior staff, both uniformed and civilian, from any criticism on high that might arise from failure. Failure generally means project delays or not remaining within budget. What has happened over the last decade is a complex process, but essentially is this ....

Guest. Thank you very much for that very clear and informative contribution. I will undoutbtedly use elements of it in future posts.

There are, though, other elements which need to be factored in. The rot, I believe, started much earlier (the Nott cuts) and it is a matter of record that, by the end of the Major regime, the mess in defence procurement had reached crisis point. Something had to be done. Much has been said and written about Brown's parsimony in the Treasury, motivated, it is claimed, by his dislike of thr Armed Forces. But the reality is that, by 1997, something had to be done about MoD spending, which was effectively out of control, made worse by a military which had lost its way in the post-Cold War era, and was having trouble defining its strategic role, and the kit it needed.

The new government, therefore, did what any new government would have had to do ... seek to impose financial discipline and rein in the huge inefficiencies and waste already in the system. That it may have gone about it in a particularly inept way is also a matter of record, but the situation was made inestimably worse by a Department to which the very idea of financial discipline was an alien concept, and which reacted with considerable hostility (and arrogance) to attempts to impose any discipline whatsoever.

When the message finally dawned that they were not going to get their money unless they started playing ball with the Treasury, the second problem kicked in ... a Department which was essentially wholly inexperienced in devising financial controls built up a matrix of complex, inept and inflexible systems, based on what it felt was needed to secure continued funding, without addressing the underlying inefficiencies in the system ... or the organisational "pathogens". This is what Gray idenitifed.

Thus, we ended up with a grossly inefficient system, administered by a creaking bureaucracy, on which was superimposed an ill-conceived and inflexible financial management system, which simply magnified pre-exisiting flaws. From there, as the system continued to deteriorate, the "tick box", "back-covering" mentality really took hold as ever more people realised the system was not working and could not work. Thus the scene for the disaster was set ...

I have to agree with Guest at 10.52pm. As I said in my post staff left the service because of problems. Richard, I know you've criticised me for not reading the report and posting, but much of my post's content was given first hand to me by a trustworthy source.

I thought it was important to my readership to name the people named in the report and that was the reason for the post. After all, I don't live a million miles away from the base concerned.

If there are inaccuracies in my post then please point them out, but don't accuse me of just copy typing the Times article because I did not do that in this case. I can be guilty on other occasions I admit.

Anyway, thank you for taking the trouble to read the whole thing. I too heard it's a hard read so I don't think I'll bother.

The trouble is that the devil is in the detail. What Haddon-Cave did - although he did not flag it up very well - was identify massive system failures of quite staggering proportions. The limits of his brief meant that he was only dealing with Airworthiness issues, but it was very clear that many of the problems he identified have more general effect. Guest touched on some of the reasons why this came about ... I have added some others. The Gray report here is also very relevant.

See here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2 ... y-day.html

In essence, we are looking at a system in decay, beyond quick solutions, with multi-factoral causes which have developed over many decades. In many respects, the people involved (named and shamed) were in positions where no one could have coped - the problems are too profound and complex. That is what I believe should come out of the report. There are no quick fixes ... the system needs fundamental reform, and that needs leadership ... at all levels, political, military and administrative.

At one level though, the leadership issue is crucial. Too many people were prepared to preside over a failing system, and keep their own counsel. For that, you need to look at the Chiefs of Air Staff, and the successive CsDS, who should have been making it very clear to the politicians what was happening, and demanding change. There is no record of that ever happening. To that extent, the military colluded in its own downfall.

[vulcan99]

Before the Nimrod was ordered, the Shackleton sqns were asked what they would like as a replacement. The consensus was for a high wing 4 turboprop aircraft with excellent visability - think Catalina, only bigger and land based. What did we get - a low wing turbojet with very restricted visability. Why did we get it? Because Harold Wilson had a dozen unused Comet 2 aircraft, a production line and a factory with lots of labour voters in it.

I might also add that I did a tour in the P2V-5F Neptune. It was full of "kit" that was a pleasure to use and which worked. The Nimrod arrived full of British "kit" that was, in the modern term, NOT user friendly.